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http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/05/the-future-resists-control.html. 
 
 Bruce Ackerman long ago persuaded me that Article V has not been the only route—or even the 
normal route—to legitimate constitutional change.  Volume 3 admirably adds nuance to Ackerman’s 
account of what happens instead.  But nuance can be a vice of a theory as well as a virtue, depending on 
whether the goal is to understand a phenomenon in its complexity or to provide an actionable program 
for the future.  We The People aims to do both: it is, after all, a grand project, probably the most 
important in constitutional thought in the last thirty years.  But in spite of its ambitions, Volume 3 may 
have helped persuade me to take Article V more seriously—not as a matter of exclusive constitutional 
authority for official decisionmakers, but as a matter of prudence for the agents of constitutional 
change. 
 
 We The People presents an originalist theory, self-consciously and emphatically so.  As such, it 
must reckon with this practical problem: human decisionmakers might not be good at enforcing the 
commitments of a prior time once those commitments have ceased to seem natural or persuasive to the 
decisionmakers themselves.  Some will try.  But it is just plain hard to understand the past on its own 
terms, rather than as a projection of the present, and judges (and Senators, and Presidents) are not 
selected for having the skills or habits of mind that make the enterprise more likely to succeed.  There is 
a natural tendency to construe a prior heroic generation’s commitments as similar to one’s own, until 
the point where one’s prior historical knowledge will not permit the dissonance, and decisionmakers 
often have little historical knowledge concretely on point until the need to make a decision both makes 
the knowledge necessary and shapes the desiderata of what the historical record should show.  Under 
the pressure to make important decisions and to make them well, sane decisionmakers are likely to 
construe ambiguities of authority to permit, or require, decisions that strike them as sensible, rather 
than decisions that strike them as less so.  For these reasons and others, even officials who in good faith 
wish to be bound by the commitments of the past are likely to fail in the attempt. 
 
Ackerman’s account has always seemed at least as vulnerable to these difficulties as other forms 
of originalism.  If anything, the historical record from which Ackerman says authoritative constitutional 
meaning emerges is less determinate than a formally enacted amendment would be, which means that 
there is yet more room for decisionmakers to interpret prior commitments to conform with their own 
intuitions about common sense.  To be sure, We The People has always offered criteria for identifying 
constitutionally significant decisions, rather than leaving interpreters completely at sea: the first two 
volumes offered a determinate model of the steps through which a new idea must pass in order to 
qualify as constitutional.  But the dynamics of constitutional change are too varied to be captured by 
such a model, just as they cannot be captured by Article V.  So it is an admirable virtue of Volume 3 that 
it acknowledges several variations on the model as earlier described.  Sometimes this institution moves 
first, and then that one; sometimes the other way; and so on.  This sensitivity to the need for a more 
flexible approach does more than display a level of open-mindedness not always seen in a leading senior 
theorist.  It also lets Ackerman tell a more persuasive story about the constitutional dynamics of the 
Second Reconstruction than would be possible if he insisted on making events conform to earlier 
versions of the theory.  But doubts about whether judges can recover and enforce the content of an 
earlier generation’s constitutional commitments only grow as the relevant history becomes less 
schematized.   
 
None of this makes Article V a reliable mechanism for preserving the content of constitutional 
commitments.  For all of the reasons given above, good-faith originalists who think of the text of the 
original Constitution and the Article V Amendments as exhausting valid constitutional authority still tend 
to reach substantive results that align with their own current intuitions about what would make sense.  
If present decisionmakers do not share the substantive commitments that underwrote an inherited 
constitutional text, the text will be of limited value in the attempt to preserve the substance of a 
constitutional enactment over time.   
 
But the triumph of a political movement today is also no guarantee of some principle’s 
becoming entrenched as a constitutional rule for any length of time: substantive commitments shape 
constitutional law, with or without constitutional text, but only as long as those commitments are 
compelling to the decisionmakers.  To a greater degree in Volume 3 than in the prior Volumes, 
Ackerman recognizes this positive reality—that officials have in practice unwound the achievements of 
constitutional transformations that no longer command popular assent, even in the absence of some 
next change that qualifies as constitutionally transformative by Ackerman’s standards.  The book still 
contends, though, that proper constitutional interpretation would recognize certain ideas that the 
People espoused during the Second Reconstruction as authoritative and entrenched.  But it doesn’t 
offer reasons why decisionmakers would be likely to treat those ideas as authoritative and entrenched, 
except of course to the extent that those decisionmakers were sympathetic to those ideas on their 
merits.  And a theory of how officials should interpret the Constitution needs to assign those officials a 
task that they could realistically execute. 
 
Constitutional lawmaking is an attempt to control the future.  But the future resists control.  
That is why neither Article V nor any other determinate process can contain all the ways in which 
constitutional arrangements might change, and it is also why neither a formal amendment nor a 
successful popular movement can guarantee the longevity of any particular practice.  But if the future 
cannot be controlled, it can sometimes be influenced—partially, uncertainly, probabilitistically.  That is, 
we can do things today that make things more or less likely to happen in the future—or at least that we 
reasonably guess will have those effects.  Changing hearts and minds is one way to try to have that 
influence; establishing institutional arrangements is another.  Enacting formal texts that purport to be 
binding authority can be a third.  Not because those texts have the power or authority to direct the 
action of future decisionmakers in the way that a civics-book constitutional theory might suppose, but 
because it is foreseeable that there will be future moments when substantive commitments are 
unsettled or contested, and in those moments decisionmakers will make use of (and be influenced by) a 
range of argumentative resources, formal constitutional texts included.  Perhaps the leaders of the Civil 
Rights Revolution never had the capacity to enact Article V amendments; perhaps any such 
amendments would have been of limited long-term value even if adopted.  But the same is true of the 
means that those leaders did employ.  In the very uncertain game of trying to entrench constitutional 
principles, it seems prudent to deploy as many tools as are available in order to maximize one’s 
chances—and then to be unsurprised if the future declines to cooperate. 
 
